Critique & Humanism | 31 | 2010 | Analytic philosophy
Issue Editors: Anna Beshkova, Evgeny Latinov, Todor Polimenov
Issue: 1, 2010, p. 246, ISSN:0861-1718
Analytic philosophy and its forgetfulness of the continent
Interview with Gottfried Gabriel by Todor Polimenov
The turn to realism and the beginning of analytic philosophy
Anna Beshkova
Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Sofia
The main topic of the paper is the connection between the turn to logical realism and the beginning of analytic philosophy. The paper is concerned especially with the overcoming of general philosophy of mind. It is shown that there are two versions of this process – a weak one and a strong one. In the former represented by Frege, thoughts are independent from individual cognitive acts. In the latter represented by G. E. Moore, judgments are absolutely independent from the mind. The conclusion is that logical realism is the origin of analytic philosophy.
The linguistic turn and other misconceptions about analytic philosophy
Pierre Wagner
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris
Three usual misconceptions about analytic philosophy are criticized: its (alleged) rejection of metaphysics, lack of interest in historical issues, and allegiance to science. A fourth one is then examined more in details, namely the claim, often attributed to Dummett, that analytic philosophy can be characterized by the linguistic turn it fi rst took with Frege. Dummett’s position on this matter is examined and assessed, and the original meaning of the phrase ‘linguistic turn’ is located in Bergmann and Rorty. Examples of its many different uses are given. It is contended that the decisive step towards a ‘linguistic turn’ was taken in Wittgenstein’sTractatus, and that the phrase is better suited to qualify either one specifi c ‘phase’ in the history of analytic philosophy or a large ‘set of methods’ which have often been used by analytic philosophers than the ‘essential feature’ of the whole tradition. Analytic philosophy is much too variegated a movement to be characterized in such a simple way.
The divide between ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ philosophy: Structural specificities and genesis
Alexander Kanev
Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Sofia
In this paper, I attempt to shed some light on the origin of the ‘analytic-continental’ divide in Western philosophy. I argue that it is essentially related to two important lines of opposition in post-Kantian philosophy, namely (1) between scientific and non-scientific, and (2) naturalist and non-naturalist philosophizing. The first line of opposition is a natural corollary of the Kantian revolution against the traditional, metaphysically oriented philosophy. According to Kant and his followers, (1) philosophy can be intellectually significant only if it is scientific, and (2) it can be scientific only if it turns its back on the ontological questions about the principles of reality as a whole and the nature of human life. As a reaction to both the Kantian and the traditional paradigm of rejected the view that philosophy should be ‘scientific’ in order to have cultural significance. The opposition between naturalist and non-naturalist tendencies of thinking is characteristic of any epoch in the history of Western philosophy. The paper briefly explains the different forms which this opposition takes in ontology, epistemology and practical philosophy. Notably, most of the scientifically oriented philosophers from Kant up to Husserl were anti-naturalists in philosophy. Thus, the opposition between scientific and non-scientific philosophy did not coincide with the opposition between naturalist and non-naturalist philosophy. This started to change when it became clear that the attempts of Husserl and his disciples to put philosophy on the secure path of a (phenomenological) science failed. The hermeneutic turn in German philosophy, initiated and completed by Heidegger and Gadamer, led to a certain convergence between non-scientific and non-naturalist ways of philosophizing in ‘Continental’ philosophy. This created the divide between the ‘Continental’ and the analytically minded philosophers, and especially between the former and the logical positivists who took natural sciences as a paradigm for genuine knowledge of reality. While Heidegger and his followers were hostile toward scientism and naturalism in philosophy, most of the analytic philosophers explicitly embraced the view that only scientific and naturalist philosophy is good philosophy.
The dream of Russell: An historico-philosophical sketch from 1912-1913
Kamen Lozev
South-West University Neofit Rilski, Blagoevgrad
The paper reveals the dream of Bertrand Russell to establish what he calls a ‘great school of philosophically educated mathematicians.’ Russell’s plan originated in a time when he was under the infl uence of Wittgenstein during his fi rst stay in Cambridge and ‘in the grip of romance’ with Ottoline Morel. Wittgenstein, Whitehead and Russell himself are the embodiment of Russell’s dream and the paper argues that the ‘great school’ is a specifi c by-product of Analytic Philosophy’s second phase of development (around 1910-1935). The dream is disclosed in three main contexts: the relationship between Russell and the young Wittgenstein, the relationship between Russell and lady Ottoline Morel and the second phase of the development of the analytic philosophical tradition
Russell, philosophical logic and relations
Todor Petkov
Plovdiv University Paisii Hilendarski, Plovdiv
The failure to distinguish method from subject-matter is in the basis of many of the problems that arise when Russell tries to think logical form relationally, and the absence of suffi cient control over the idealizations of the science of logic annihilates the thrust of his revolutionary turn to ‘logical data’ – an annihilation without which he could be not a mere predecessor but a direct participant in the so-called praxeological turn in logic. The article considers how this ensues from his conception of philosophical logic, how the relationist philosophical logical analysis is carried out and to what paradoxes it can lead. An idea is proposed as to what levels of idealization can become visible with such an optic on Russell.
Wittgenstein on the logic of the ‘inner’ in his remarks on the philosophy of psychology
Todor Polimenov
Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Sofia
Starting with the question of how an expression is given to the so-called inner (human experiences, “Erlebnisse”), two distinct groups of themes that seem to provide an answer are analyzed in the beginning of the paper: the theme of aspect seeing and the theme of the inadequacy of the picture of the inner. First of all, it is argued that the inner is seen primarily as a specific aspect. Then an attempt is made at explaining why, nevertheless, the picture of the inner is a dangerous metaphor. Finally, the conception is introduced that what actually gives an expression to the inner is the special logic of the usage of the words about it. This logic makes itself manifest in the consequences to be drawn from utterances about inner states; it is characterized by certain indeterminacy of inferences and the resulting uncertainty of the knowledge about the inner. These characteristics, however, do not imply that the mental is hidden in some sort of inner space, as it has been widely assumed in the tradition, but rather reflect the peculiarity and complexity of the language games, in which the inner is being described.
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz on normativity of language rules
Vihren Bouzov
Veliko Turnovo University St. Cyril and St. Methodius, Veliko Turnovo
The aim of the paper is to compare selected theses of ‘late’ Wittgenstein and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, a signifi cant Polish analytic philosopher. Their philosophical ideas are interpreted as paradigmatic patterns of the so-called directive theories of meaning. These theories stipulate that linguistic meanings are constructed on the basis of defi nite normative rules. The comparative analysis is carried out with respect to the great transformation of the contemporary philosophy of language: from abstract formal studies of language to a pragmatic turn in their development. Wittgenstein’s conception of meanings has in fact brought a new import into K. Ajdukiewicz’s ideas of language which have undeservedly been underrated even until the present day. It is very interesting that the conceptions of the Polish philosopher are based on pragmatic considerations, too. He takes into account also the active role of the members of a linguistic community as creators of communicative instruments. The problem of the genesis of public meanings is the bottom-line problem of the directive theories of meaning. How could one overcome antirealism at this level?
How analytic philosophy has failed cognitive science
Robert Brandom
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh
Concept-use is intrinsically stratified. It exhibits at least four basic layers, with each capacity to deploy concepts in a more sophisticated sense of ‘concept’ presupposing the capacities to use concepts in all of the more primitive senses. The three lessons that generate the structural hierarchy oblige us to distinguish between: (1) concepts that only label and concepts thatdescribe; (2) the content of concepts and the force of applying them; and (3) concepts expressible already by simple predicates and concepts expressible only by complex predicates. This hierarchy is not a psychological one, but a logical and semantic one. Concepts at the higher levels of complexity presuppose those at lower levels not because creatures of a certain kind cannot in practice, as a matter of fact, deploy the more complex kinds unless they can deploy the simpler ones, but because in principle it is impossible to do so. Nothing could count as grasping or deploying the kinds of concepts that populate the upper reaches of the hierarchy without also grasping or deploying those drawn from its lower levels. The dependencies involved are not empirical, but (meta)conceptual. AI researchers and cognitive, developmental, and animal psychologists need to take account of the different grades of conceptual content made visible by these distinctions.
Why isn’t contemporary formal logic only formal?
Evgeny Latinov
Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Sofia
The paper points at two characteristics of modern logic – its formality, which it shares with traditional logic, and one other feature that distinguishes it from the traditional logic: its capability for constructing extra-logical content. This second feature, which comes to be possible through the formal systems, gives a reason to look at modern formal logic not only as „formal logic”.
The classical analysis of knowledge and ‘Gettier’s problem’
Aneta Karageorgieva
Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Sofia
After presenting the newest interpretation of classical analysis of knowledge, this paper treats the consequences of Gettier’s counterexamples for our contemporary understanding of the nature of knowledge. Critical review of some conservative and nonconservative re-formulations of knowledge analysis follows, using original examples and arguments. This enables the author to argue for a naturalistic view of knowledge without excluding pragmatic criteria for its recognition and/or confirmation. In the debate between externalism and internalism, the side of the former is being taken, and a functionalist approach to knowledge is being presented and defended briefly.
Counterfactual conditionals and modal epistemology
Blagovest Mollov
Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Sofia
blagovest_mollov@sclg.uni-sofia.bg
The paper raises some questions concerning Timothy Williamson’s suggestion that the epistemology of metaphysically modal thinking is a special case of the epistemology of counterfactuals. It points to diffi culties in the formal derivation of metaphysical modalities from counterfactual logic, questions the interpretation of the signifi cance of the alleged logical equivalences Williamson proves, and discusses the proposed sketch of a counterfactual epistemology. I argue that at best Williamson’s claim needs additional argumentation while probably suffering from irremediable circularity at worst.
Russell’s paradox of the totality of propositions: Extensible quantifiers and semantic stability
Rosen Lutskanov
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia
The objective of this paper is to draw some probable conclusions founded on close scrutiny of Russell’s ‘other’ contradiction – the paradox of the totality of propositions. It is suggested that this antinomy casts serious doubts on unrestricted propositional quantifi cation which is presupposed in the traditional rendering of logical laws as universally valid principles. That is why here I propose a strictly alternative interpretation of quantifi cation founded on Dummett’s theory of indefi nite extensibility which is couched in the formalism of Feferman’s schematically presented theories. This train of reasoning suggests a natural delineation of the realm of logic – it comprises precisely those notions that are semantically stable, i.e. retain constant interpretation in the process of indefi nite extension of the initial domain of reasoning.
Minimalism and contextualism. An essay into metasemantics
Maria Stoicheva
Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Sofia
Minimal semantics and contextualism have proved to be of central interest in the philosophy of language recently. This opposition seems to be akin to a series of previous discussions concerning contents possessed by sentences, the primary bearers of meaning and what is communicated by a speaker who utters a sentence. It bears resemblance to Strawson’s thesis of the confl ict between theorists of formal semantics and theorists of communication-intention and Grice’s notion of ‘what is said by a sentence’ that fed philosophy of language in the second half of the 20th century. This paper aims at presenting the current approaches to semantic theory from the perspective of the no context in determining semantic content. It explores the dynamic of their relationship and outlines the main features of what can be considered a new round of the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy. Minimalism is explored as the outcome of the interface between the two approaches and as a viable semantic option to further infl uence signifi cant philosophical topics within philosophy of language. Contextualism articulates the concept of context-dependence and makes it inseparable from the process of content possession. I conclude by suggesting that there are further potential epistemological consequences that are to be highlighted.
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of praxis
Asia Markova
New Bulgarian University, Sofia
In this paper, I attempt to elucidate what is the positive concept of philosophy related to the analyses of language games by late Wittgenstein. For this purpose, I trace the usage of the concept of praxis in the Philosophical Investigations and highlight three of its aspects: rule following, innovativeness, and a certain interactive moment that explains the intertwining of regular uses and innovative introductions in our language. With regard to this complex Wittgenstein’s concept of praxis, I articulate the utility of analytic philosophy of language through its potential to fi nd one-sided generalizing theses based only on private and particularist claims on truthfulness. The stake of such philosophy with orientation to praxis is to reveal that even beyond the conceptual apparatus of philosophy of mind it is possible today to preserve certain universal meanings around which we could unite. The condition for this is to leave open the possibility for critique which fi nds its practical justifi cation in the interrelation between innovativeness and rule following in the sense of Wittgenstein.