The subject of the text is the logical analysis of the concepts of necessary condition and sufficient condition. Three explanations of what they mean are considered. The first, the material implication account, has the absurd consequence that if two sentences are true, the states of affairs they express are necessary and sufficient conditions for one another. In addition, it contradicts the way the concepts are used in mathematics, where a necessary or sufficient condition is given through a predicate rather than a sentence. The second explanation, the strict implication account, does not have the first of the above two deficiencies but has the key disadvantage that it is not applicable to the extensional language of mathematics, where the two expressions are most commonly used. The article defends an explanation through a formal implication. Unlike the other two, the formal implication account corresponds to mathematical usage. Moreover, when the necessary or sufficient condition is given through a sentence instead of a predicate, the account treats it as an intentional (modal) expression, which avoids the absurd consequence of the first account.

In this paper we present Paul Grice’s most influential insights on language. According to him, the analysis of linguistic meaning should be based on the speaker’s intention to produce an effect in their audience. And the process of understanding is analyzed by Grice as consisting (generally) of the following components: i) X intends to produce an effect in Y by having Y recognize this intention; ii) Y recognizes the intention of X and thus the intended effect is produced. These intentions lie at the core of all types of meaning distinguished by Grice: from the timeless meaning of an expression in a language to the specific utterer’s meaning on a given occasion. Since the conventional meaning of a sentence can differ from the utterer’s meaning on a given occasion, the notion of implicature is introduced as a way of explaining the connection between the two. The specific utterer’s meaning on a given occasion is, for Grice, the most fundamental form of meaning, having a logical priority over the timeless meaning. From this point of view, pragmatics is the framework in which natural language semantics should be examined in order to be better understood.

The present text proposes a new way to tackle the metaphysics of modality, which is based on the concept of “actualized possibility”. It is organized as follows: (§1) scrutinizes the traditional reductive approaches to the concept of possibility; (§2) proposes reasons to accept the thesis that the possibility-talk is correlative to the discourse about causes and reasons; (§3) examines the conceptual apparatus of promise theory; (§4) utilizes this apparatus in order to explicate twelve different “agent modalities”; (§5) discusses the connection between these agent modalities and the classical “system” modalities. The thesis that the text aims to substantiate is that the agent modalities (which relate possibilities to capabilities) are basic and ontologically charged.

The paper discusses the modal-tensed response to van Inwagen’s objection against Lewis’s indexical theory of actuality. Yagisawa’s proposal is shown to fail in its intentions mainly on account of the inherent problems of modal dimensionalism in general that make the response either argumentatively irrelevant or question-begging.

This text is republished in fragments for educational purposes. Translation into Bulgarian from: David Lewis, Philosophical papers, vol. I, Oxford University Press (1983), pp. 10 – 26.

The paper reconstructs the early attempts of Donald Davidson to design a formal theory of truth – and, hence, a formal semantics for the ordinary languages. Following his failures to realize this task step by step the paper deconstructs the very task. If truth is to be understood as a formal “relation between sentences, speakers, and dates” as Davidson initially suggests then the demonstratives (all the language devices pointing out contextual circumstances and times) should be treated as “logical constants”. But such a formal treatment – in the course of the attempts to be found – appears to be mission impossible. Moreover, nearly in the same time Davidson finds that the “saying that” and the “quotation” have explicitly demonstrative character. But “saying that” and “quotation” are integral parts of truth-saying: the quotation and disquotation are even at the core of the Tarski’s formalized T-equivalence. Taking into account this discovery as well as Davidson’s misfortunate attempts to formalize the demonstratives we can infer: not a formal one but some explicitly demonstrative theory of truth should be developed from here. This is the direction sketched out not by Davidson but by the author in the end of the paper.

The article associates Husserl’s analytics of the living body (Leiblichkeit) and the division of the body into organic and physical body (Leib-Körper) in the Life-World, with the problem of the so-called “non-genuine localization” of experience (a problem that can be seen as inheriting the problem of indexicality from the time of Logical Investigation). At stake is not so much the reconstruction of Husserl’s intensive work on this topic throughout the 1920s and the 1930s as the outlining of the field of a differential phenomenology of incorporatedness, inspired by this heritage. The bodily dimension is conceived here as a process – as being flesh (leiben – an analogue of living itself, leben) that creates its own forms of spatiality, temporality, and living-with. Different configurations of incorporatedness stem from here, which can be analyzed as bodily modalizations since they concern the alterability of the being-so-and-so on the level of kinesthesis; the bodily modalizations are precisely kinesthetic, and the privileged modus is that of the “absolute here” of the body of experience. In the first section I present a case of everyday life bodily dissociation and I analyze the kinesthetic modality of “as if I’m there.” In the second section I offer an outline of the structure of the originary differential field in which the poles of kinesthetic habitualization and of reified corporality are formed. In the third section I discuss Husserl’s ideas regarding the doubling of space into physical and kinesthetical as well as the constitution of the so-called phantom body. In the fourth section I reinterpret Husserl’s conception of the incorporated ego through the ego’s division into a coenaesthetic and a habitual ego. Just like the Leib-Körper, the incorporated ego is constantly faced with the possibility her constitutive non-coincidence to be fractalized and turn into a partial or complete dissociation.

By this text I seek an experimental goal – a comparative reading of Françoise Dolto’s book „The Unconscious Body Image“ and Darin Tenev’s article „Modalities, Modalisations, Modal Transitions“ and, on this basis, seeking an adequate commensurability between different disciplinary fields of both texts. Such a comparative reading presupposes the hypothesis that socio- and psychoanalytic concepts, theses and arguments have a chance to encounter in the „no-man’s land“ of the body as openness, as intensity and inclining of forces, as immanent modalisation without substance, where modalisation of modalities acquires the affective power of transmodalities and their role in modal and transmodal transitions. Re-indexicalisation relies on the immanent dynamism of the transcendental as a place-giving opening of space.

The paper presents some evidences about the “speech and deeds” of the famous Athenian wiseman, legislator and poet from the Archaic age, Solon. The performative situations in question, mainly according Plutarch’s “Live of Solon”, are interpreted also in the terms of the modern analytical philosophy in order both to deepen and do reformulate methodically our understanding of the specificity of the preliminary oral Archaic culture and of the forms and dimensions of the successful communication between citizens and ruling subjects. Discussed are episodes with theatrically setting in state of emergency, but also other, rejecting the playful substitution of roles in the real theatre performance; examples of political anger and weakness… However, figures like Solon are as a rule described as speaking and acting in search for the proper recipients and for the truth to the attainable for a human being degree.